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The ability of animals to remember the what, where and when of a unique past
event is used as an animal equivalent to human episodic memory. We cur-
rently view episodic memory as reconstructive, with an event being
remembered in the context in which it took place. Importantly, this means
that the components of a what, where, when memory task should be dissoci-
able (e.g. what would be remembered to a different degree than when). We
tested this hypothesis by training hummingbirds to a memory task, where
the location of a reward was specified according to colour (what), location
(where), and order and time of day (when). Although hummingbirds remem-
bered these three pieces of information together more often than expected,
there was a hierarchy as to how they were remembered. When seemed to
be the hardest to remember, while errors relating to what were more easily
corrected. Furthermore, when appears to have been encoded as a combi-
nation of time of day and sequence information. As hummingbirds solved
this task using reconstruction of different memory components (what,
where and when), we suggest that similar deconstructive approaches may
offer a useful way to compare episodic and episodic-like memories.1. Introduction
Episodicmemory is the systembywhich humans recall their past experiences and it
is this experience that distinguishes it from semantic memory. While semantic
memory covers ‘known’memories, such as remembering that theBattle ofHastings
took place in 1066, an episodic memory is one for which the individual has a sense
of the event having occurred within a personal past [1], for example reminiscing
about sitting in a classroom looking out of the window while learning about the
Battle of Hastings. Given that the focus of this definition is on the individual’s sub-
jective experience, it has been suggested that episodic memory relies on faculties
such as autonoetic consciousness (i.e. an ability to imagine ourselves in the past)
and a sense of subjective time [2]. This renders episodic memory either a uniquely
human ability or at least only (currently) accessible to study in humans.
Given this difficulty in testing episodic memory in animals, researchers have
redefined the problem under the banner of ‘episodic-like’ memory [3]. This has
been defined as the ability to integrate the what, the where and the when aspects
of a unique past event and to use that memory flexibly to guide behaviour [4].
As a result of using this definition, the ability to act on these three components
of a past event simultaneously has now been demonstrated in a range of species
(including scrub jays, Aphelocoma coerulescens: [3], chickadees, Poecile atricapillus:
[5], meadow voles, Microtus pennsylvanicus: [6] and rats Rattus norvegicus: [7]).
Although there is considerable debate regarding the extent to which episodic-
like memory resembles episodic memory [8–10], the central tenet of episodic
memory, the experience of the individual, is currently untestable and seems
likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. There are, however, other features of
episodicmemory that are amenable to investigationwithin an episodic-like frame-
work. For example, episodic memory in humans is regarded as reconstructive
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2[11–13]: that is events are not stored as awhole inmemoryas by
a video recorder, but rather via a system in which the elements
of a memory are stored separately and recombined to create the
event as it is recollected. This leads to various predictable errors
when memory fails [14–16]. By contrast, episodic-like memory
investigations typically require an animal to demonstrate that it
can remember the three memory components together. If the
same mechanisms underpin both episodic-like memory and
episodic memory, we suggest that the components of memory
of the former should also be dissociable and recombined at
the point of recall. This reconstruction may on occasion be
imperfect or incomplete, as is often the case for human
memory, and thus the errors made in episodic-like memory
tasks may be as informative as animals’ successes. If animals
make errors in episodic-like memory tasks that are comparable
to the errors humans make when using episodic memory, per-
haps these two systems are similar in form as well as function.
Hummingbirds provide a useful model system for studying
the interplayof different sorts of information inmemory, as they
can remember numerous aspects of the flowers fromwhich they
feed, including their colour [17,18], location [19–22] and when
they were last visited [23,24]: what, where and when. Here, we
investigated whether in a system where the what, where and
when components of memories can be experimentally manipu-
lated, whether hummingbirds remembered all three pieces of
information together as a whole or whether errors tended to
reflect failure to recall one aspect of what, where and when
(Experiment 1). If hummingbirds do not make errors at
random with respect to what, where and when, then perhaps
these pieces of information are stored separately in memory,
in amannerconsistentwith the reconstructivemodel of episodic
memory. In particular, we predicted that when would be the
piece of information causing the most frequent errors, as this
is frequently the most difficult aspect of episodic-like memory
to demonstrate [25,26]. In our first experiment, birds might
remember the temporal (when) component either by the
sequence of rewarded flowers or by the time of day. In our
second experiment, we tested whether the birds use time of
day, sequence or a combination of the two.2. Material and methods
(a) Subjects
The subjects in these experiments were 18 free-living male rufous
hummingbirds defending feeding territories along the Westcastle
Valley, in the Eastern range of the Rocky Mountains (498210 N,
1148250 W), Alberta, Canada (12 in Experiment 1; six in Exper-
iment 2). Each territory was centred on a single hummingbird
feeder, containing 14% sucrose solution. Birds were marked on
their breast feathers with a small amount of non-toxic ink, to allow
individuals to be identified. Observations were conducted between
07.30 and 19.30 (Mountain Standard Time). Experiment 1 was
conducted in June–July 2005 and June 2006, and Experiment 2
from June to July 2008. All work was carried out under permit
from Environment Canada and Alberta Sustainable Resource
Development with the ethical approval of the University of
Lethbridge Animal Welfare Committee.
(b) Experiment 1
(i) Training
There were 2 days of training prior to the experimental pro-
cedure. On the first of these days, we presented each bird withan array of four flowers, coloured blue, red, pink or purple and
arranged in a rough 60  60 cm square. One flower was filled
with sucrose and the remaining three were filled with water,
which the birds find unpalatable. The bird was allowed to visit
this array until he had fed from the sucrose-filled flower six
times, after which time the flowers were removed and the
bird’s feeder was replaced. This completed the training for the
‘Morning’ session. The ‘Afternoon’ training began at least 4
hours later. The bird was presented with the second array of
four flowers of the same colours in the same relative positions
but in a new location at least 10 m from the location of the morn-
ing array. For the afternoon array, the rewarded flower was not
of the same colour as that rewarded in the morning array and
the remaining three flowers contained water. Again, the bird
was allowed to feed from the rewarded flower six times.
(ii) Experimental procedure
Following training, in the morning (at any time between 07.30
and 11.00, with the time broadly consistent across days for
each bird), we removed a bird’s feeder and presented him with
both the morning and afternoon arrays of flowers simul-
taneously, arranged as they had been the previous day. The
only flower of the eight to contain sucrose was the one that
had been rewarded in the previous morning’s training. All the
remaining seven flowers contained water. The bird was allowed
to visit any of the flowers until he had made six visits to the
sucrose-filled flower, which was refilled after each visit, at
which point both arrays were removed and the feeder was
replaced. Four hours after both arrays were removed, they
were returned but with the afternoon flower being the only
flower containing reward. Again, the bird was allowed to visit
flowers until he had visited the sucrose-filled flower six times.
His feeder was then returned for the remainder of the day.
All visits to all flowers were recorded at both morning and
afternoon sessions. The number of sessions (morning and after-
noon included) experienced by each male varied from 5 to 17
(median ¼ 12).
In this design, therewere three pieces of information that a bird
needed to use in order to locate the rewarded flower: What: the
flower’s colour; Where: the array in which the flower is located
and When: whether it is the morning or the afternoon. We could,
therefore, look at whether these components of memory are separ-
able by looking at the errors birds made, as they can be classified
according to which of these pieces of information is missing
from a bird’s choice (figure 1). What errors were those where the
bird chose the correct array at the correct time of day but a
flower of the wrong colour (chance ¼ 0.375); where errors were
those where the bird chose a flower of the correct colour at the cor-
rect time but in thewrong array (chance ¼ 0.125); when errorswere
those where the bird chose the flower of the correct colour and in
the correct array, but that was the flower that was rewarded at
the alternative time (chance ¼ 0.125); all-wrong errors were those
where the bird chose a flower of the wrong colour, in the wrong
place and at the wrong time (chance ¼ 0.250). Correct choices
were those in which the bird chose the rewarded flower
(chance ¼ 0.125).
There are two different aspects of birds’ errors that we can
examine in this experiment: the kinds of error made and how
the birds went about correcting them. To determine whether
some errors were easier to correct than the others, we looked at
birds’ subsequent choices after making an error, either up to
the point where they located the rewarded flower or to their
fourth choice within a trial (birds failed to find the rewarded
flower within the first four visits on only 20 of a total of 134
trials). We then constructed a partition tree (R package rpart)
modelling whether or not an error was corrected on a subsequent
choice as a function of trial number, visit number within a trial,
the type of error made on the last visit and the individual.
array layout
AM training
what errors
where error
when error
all-wrong
= 60 cm
rewarded in the morning
rewarded in the 
afternoon
= artificial
   flowers
ª 10 m
correct
Figure 1. Schematic showing the two arrays of Experiment 1 and also the flower categorizations (e.g. correct or a what error) for morning trials.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
ProcR
SocB
280:20132194
3(c) Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, when is defined both by time of day and
sequence (i.e. the afternoon comes after the morning). To assess
how birds were using these two components to estimate when,
we conducted the second experiment in which we presented
the birds with the same arrays as used in Experiment 1 in morn-
ing and afternoon sessions for 5 days. For Experiment 2,
however, we included a test phase whereby birds were given
an Early test: 2 hours before a morning session; a Midday test:
in-between the morning and afternoon sessions; and a Late
test: 2 hours after the afternoon session was completed.
Birds were allowed to make one visit to the arrays during
each of these early/midday/late tests, after which all flowers
were removed and the feeder was replaced. All flowers were
empty during these tests. To reiterate, during testing birds con-
tinued to experience morning and afternoon trainings at the
usual times and birds only experienced one test session per
day. The order of the tests was randomized between birds and
each bird completed each test only once.
Depending on whether birds used sequential or time of day
information, or some combination of the two, birds’ choices at
these tests should differ and the explanations for how birds
might choose a flower are as follows:
(i) Birds always chose randomly between the morning and
afternoon flower, irrespective of time (chance). Predic-
tion: birds would choose the morning and afternoon
flowers equally across all three tests.
(ii) Birds always chose the morning flower, irrespective of
time (all AM). Prediction: birds would choose the morn-
ing flower across all three tests.
(iii) Birds always chose the afternoon rewarded flower, irre-
spective of time (all PM). Prediction: birds would
choose the afternoon flower across all three tests.
(iv) Birds always chose the flower corresponding to the time
of day nearest to that to which they were trained (time of
day). Prediction: birds would choose the morning flower
in the early test, show no preference in the midday test
and would choose the afternoon flower in the late test.
(v) Birds always chose the next flower due to be rewarded in
the sequence (sequence: avoid previous). Prediction: birdswould choose the morning flower in the early test, the
afternoon flower in the midday test and the morning
flower in the late test.
(vi) Birds always avoided the next flower due to be rewarded
in the sequence (sequence: avoid next). Prediction: birds
would choose the afternoon flower in the early test (as
the next reward would be the morning flower), the morn-
ing flower in themidday test (as the next rewardwould be
the afternoon flower) and the afternoon flower in the late
test (as the next reward would be the morning flower the
following day).
(vii) Birds combined sequential and time of day information to
make their flower choices (mixed). Prediction: birds would
choose the afternoon flower in the early test (as the morn-
ing flower would be rewarded at the time experienced
during morning training and the rewarded flower alter-
nates), equally between the morning and afternoon
flowers in the midday test (as this test is midway between
two known but different rewards) and the morning flower
in the late test (as the last reward experienced was that of
the flower from the afternoon and the reward alternates).
As the aim of these tests was to compare which of the two
flowers (morning or afternoon) birds expected to contain the
reward at untrained times of day, we modelled this test as a
binary choice, where birds could either choose to visit the morning
or the afternoon flower. This meant that we had to exclude cases
in which birds made their first choice in a test to a flower that was
never rewarded, which accounted for only one of 18 test trials. We
used a likelihood approach to compare the likelihood of each
hypothesis given the data [27]. We calculated the probability of
observing the birds’ choices under each of these scenarios and
compared the negative log-likelihoods (2LL), with the smallest
2LL denoting the most likely of the competing hypotheses [27].3. Results
(a) Experiment 1
Male rufous hummingbirds were able to learn a what, where,
when task, making their first choice to the correct flower
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Figure 2. Proportion of first choices of each type in Experiment 1. The solid
line at 0.125 represents chance for when, where and correct choices. The
dashed line at 0.375 represents chance for what choices. The dotted line
at 0.25 represents chance for all-wrong choices. Birds made correct choices
significantly more often than chance, fewer all-wrong errors than chance,
fewer what errors than chance and more when errors than chance.
first decision
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previous what error:
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previous where, when or
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correcting errors
correct error
correct error
Figure 3. Hummingbird choices were corrected non-randomly. 47/134
choices of the birds’ first decision were correct, while 87/134 were errors.
Where birds made what errors (whether on their first, second or third
choice), 86% of the next choices were to the correct flower. However, if
birds made a where, when or all-wrong error, 75% of the next choices
were also wrong.
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Figure 4. The number of birds that made their first choice to the morning
and afternoon flowers at the early, midday and late tests. Striped portions of
bars represent choices of the afternoon rewarded flower, clear bars represent
choices of the morning rewarded flower and dotted bars represent choices of
unrewarded flowers.
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4significantly more often than expected by chance (t11 ¼ 6.16,
p, 0.001). Correspondingly, birds made all-wrong errors
significantly less often than expected by chance (t11 ¼ 9.32,
p, 0.001). Critically, the prevalence of what, where and
when errors differed. As predicted, when errors occurred
more often than expected by chance (t11 ¼ 3.09, p ¼ 0.010).
Furthermore, what errors occurred less often than chance
and where errors occurred at chance levels: (what: t11 ¼ 2.41,
p ¼ 0.035, where: t11 ¼ 0.71, p ¼ 0.494; figure 2).
Not only were errors non-random, when males made a
what error but also they were much more likely to visit the
correct flower on their next choice (86% of choices following
a what error) than when they had made a where, when or
all-wrong error (25% of these errors; figure 3).
(b) Experiment 2
In early tests, the birds’ chose the flower rewarded in the after-
noon significantly more often than expected by chance: all six
birds chose the afternoon rewarded flower (two-tailed test bino-
mial test:N ¼ 6, test-proportion¼ 0.5, exact p ¼ 0.031; figure 4).
In the midday tests, the birds’ performance did not differ
significantly from chance: four birds chose the flower rewarded
in the morning and two chose the flower rewarded in the after-
noon (two-tailed binomial test: N ¼ 6, test-proportion ¼ 0.5,
exact p ¼ 0.688). In the late tests, birds tended to choose the
flower rewarded in the morning (two-tailed test binomial test:
N ¼ 5, test-proportion¼ 0.5, exact p ¼ 0.063): five birds chose
the flower rewarded in the morning while the sixth bird
chose a flower that was never rewarded (we excluded this
choice from the analysis). When we compared the birds’ per-
formance across the early, midday and late tests with our
hypotheses, their choices were most consistent with those
predicted by the mixed hypothesis (2LL¼ 0.678; table 1).4. Discussion
Rufous hummingbirds’ errors on this what, where, when task
were not random. Errors very rarely represented a failure to
remember any aspect of the rewarded flower (i.e. all-wrong
errors), rather their errors generally represented the failure
to remember one aspect of the what, where or when. In particu-
lar, birds were most likely to make errors regarding when aflower should be rewarded. This is consistent with other
studies, where the time component appears to be the most
difficult for many animals to learn [25,26]. Furthermore,
birds made what errors less frequently than expected by
chance. It therefore appears that these birds store what,
where and when as separate pieces of information, as is
thought to be the case for human episodic memory [13].
Not only were birds less likely to make what errors, when
these errors did occur they were more likely to be followed by
a visit to the correct flower. Here, what is signalled by flower
colour, and previous research has suggested that while hum-
mingbirds can use colour to direct foraging when no other cue
is available [17,18], colour information tends to be oversha-
dowed by spatial information [22,24,28]. The ready correction
of what errors would suggest that birds knew the correct
flower colour but preferred to use other information first. It is
worth noting that not all what errors in this experiment were
equivalent: birds either chose the flower colour rewarded at
the alternative time (one of three flowers) or a flower colour
Table 1. A likelihood analysis of possible decision rules that male hummingbirds may have used to choose which ﬂowers to visit in Experiment 2. We tested
seven hypotheses, including random choice (chance) and ﬁxed choice rules (all morning ﬂowers or all afternoon ﬂowers) plus four hypotheses related to time of
day, sequence and a combination of time and sequence (see main text for more details). The negative log-likelihoods (–LL) of obtaining the observed patterns
of ﬂower choice across the three tests (early, middle and late) under each hypothesis were calculated using the binomial probability distribution. The smallest
value of –LL indicates the hypothesis with the best support given the data. When a hypothesis involves the probability of choosing the morning ﬂower being
either p ¼ 1 or p ¼ 0 (i.e. always choosing the morning ﬂower or never choosing the morning ﬂower), we used p ¼ 0.99 and p ¼ 0.01 to facilitate the
likelihood calculations.
hypothesis
expected probability of choosing
the morning ﬂower negative log-likelihood (2LL)
early midday late sum
(1) chance 0.50 0.50 0.50 3.94
(2) all AM 0.99 0.99 0.99 14.90
(3) all PM 0.01 0.01 0.01 16.90
(4) time of day 0.99 0.50 0.01 22.60
(5) sequence (avoid previous) 0.99 0.01 0.99 18.90
(6) sequence (avoid next) 0.01 0.99 0.01 12.90
(7) mixed 0.01 0.50 0.99 0.68
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5that was never rewarded (two of three flowers). It seems that
there is a difference in how readily birds made these two types
of errors: most of the birds’ what errors in training were to the
colour rewarded at the other time (33 of 37 initial what errors),
rather than to one of the two never rewarded colours. Given
that most of these what errors were to a specific type of flower,
the proportion of what errors relative to chance was actually
very high (figures 2 and 3). It seems likely that birds may have
learned which flower colours were rewarded and which were
not, but their errors stemmed from failing to integrate this infor-
mation with where and when. We cannot, however, yet exclude
the possibility that owing to the distance (10 m) that separated
the two arrays correcting what errors was less costly than was
correcting where or when errors. Testing this possibility (and
indeed exploring the optimal use of multi-component memory
more generally) requires further experimentation.
Based on the difficulty that animals often have had in
remembering the when component in episodic-like exper-
iments [25,26], we predicted that the birds would find the
when component of the task the most difficult to remember,
which was indeed the case. However, this component of
the task was distinct from the where or what components in
that there was more than one kind of information about
when that the birds could have used, as the rewarded
flower could have been predicted by both the time of day
and by the sequence in which arrays were rewarded across
the day. Experiment 2 suggests that the hummingbirds
used both time of day and sequence information in combi-
nation: they learned a sequence (i.e. that the reward in the
two flowers alternated) but they also learned that the
sequence was anchored to specific times of day. This expla-
nation is consistent with the finding that rats can combine
different types of information to guide their behaviour [29].
Under its original formulation, animals must remember
all three of what, where and when simultaneously in order to
show episodic-like memory [4]. However, this all-or-nothing
approach to memory is not in close accord with human episo-
dic memories, which are often incomplete and thought to
be recalled byusing reconstructive processes, where an episodeis reassembled as it is recalled [12]. While our experiment does
not directly test episodic-like memory, as animals received
repeated trials on the same task, our data suggest that the
what, where and when components of a memory may likewise
be separable in animals. The separability of these components
of a memory is supported by the variation in memory impair-
ments in mice trained to a what, where and when task [30]:
hippocampal-lesioned animals were impaired on the overall
task, while mice with lesions to the prefrontal cortex were
specifically impaired on the where element of the task.
If what, where and when are indeed remembered in a recon-
structive way by hummingbirds and other animals, there may
be a number of ways to investigate the similarities (or not)
between human episodic memory and animal episodic-like
memory. In humans, the integrative nature of episodic
memory leads to a variety of memory failures that may be
amenable to testing in animals. These include generalization,
where subjects incorrectly remember aspects of an event that
did not occur owing to their close relation to an event’s
actual context. For example, subjects will frequently ‘remem-
ber’ words they have not seen if a list of words contains
other thematically relatedwords, such as remembering hospital
having seen the words ambulance, doctor, operation, X-ray, ward,
etc. [14,15]. Another type of reconstructive memory error is
blending, where two memories which share many features
can be confused with each other and combined to make a
novel (and inaccurate)memory [16]. Given that our experiment
suggests that information about what, where and when are
also separable in animal memory, it seems to us that it would
be useful to look for these kinds of reconstruction errors in
episodic-like tasks, to see whether animal memory resembles
human memory in form as well as content.
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